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IN LIGHT OF THE DECISION IN STATE OF FLORIDA V. U.S. DEPT.
OF HHS, WHICH DECLARED THE ENTIRE HEALTH CARE ACT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL,

AND

IN

ORDER

TO

MAINTAIN

UNIFORMITY OF LAWS WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THIS
COURT MUST DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
RAISED IN THIS CASE
On January 31, 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida issued its decision declaring the Act unconstitutional in its
entirety. State of Florida, et al. v. United States Dept. of Health and Human
Services, et al., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D.Fla.2011)( “Florida”).
In Florida, U.S. District Judge Roger Vinson concluded that not only the
Individual Mandate but also the entire Act was unconstitutional:
“The individual mandate is outside Congress’ Commerce Clause
power, and it cannot be otherwise authorized by an assertion of power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause…Because the individual
mandate is unconstitutional and not severable, the entire Act must be
declared void.”
Id. at *33, *40.
Since the decision in Florida was released there has been an ongoing
discussion as to whether or not Judge Vinson’s order enjoins the government from
any further enforcement of the Act. However, Judge Vinson’s order is unequivocal
as to this point:
“The last issue to be resolved is the plaintiffs' request for injunctive
relief enjoining implementation of the Act, which can be disposed of
1
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very quickly. Injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary’ and ‘drastic’
remedy. It is even more so when the party to be enjoined is the federal
government, for there is a long-standing presumption ‘that officials of
the Executive Branch will adhere to the law as declared by the court.
As a result, the declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of
an injunction. [D]eclaratory judgment is, in a context such as this
where federal officers are defendants, the practical equivalent of
specific relief such as an injunction ... since it must be presumed
that federal officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court.’
There is no reason to conclude that this presumption should not apply
here. Thus, the award of declaratory relief is adequate and separate
injunctive relief is not necessary.”

Id. at *39-*40 (emphasis in original and added)(internal citations omitted). In other
words, Judge Vinson did not issue an injunction because the Act is void, and,
therefore, the government may no longer enforce any of its provisions.
Consequently, there is nothing to enjoin. Id.
Measured in constitutional dimensions, the legal effect of Florida is truly
extraordinary, as it creates two distinct classes of citizens within the Ninth Circuit’s
jurisdiction. In particular, the States of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and
Washington are plaintiffs in Florida, Id. at *1, fn. 1, and therefore, their citizens
are not required to comply with the Act. Id. at *39-*40. Contrariwise, the citizens
of the states of California, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon are still subject to the
Act’s provisions. Viewed from a national level, the Act no longer applies in over
half of the states (i.e., 26 states are plaintiffs in Florida, Id at. *1, fn. 1).
Consequently, Florida creates an Equal Protection problem in this circuit for
2
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citizens of California, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon.
In addition to the reasons provided in Section II, infra, the legal disability
created by Florida immediately vests appellants Baldwin and Pacific Justice with
Article III standing to challenge the Individual Mandate so that they may pursue
legal recourse to be placed on a level playing field with citizens of the States of
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington. Accordingly, in order to have
uniformity of laws within all of the nine States in this circuit, this Court must
decide the following constitutional questions:
A.

Whether Florida should be given effect in this circuit to include the

States of California, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon.
B.

Whether the Individual Mandate is unconstitutional because Congress

exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.
C.

Whether the entire Act is unconstitutional because the Individual

Mandate is not severable from the Act.

II.

INDEPENDENT OF THE DECISION IN FLORIDA, APPELLANTS’
CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE UNDER ARTICLE III

A.

INTRODUCTION
This country’s citizens have been met with an historic exercise of power by

the government in the form of the Act. For the first time in the Nation’s history,

3
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the federal government seeks to force American citizens to enter into contractual
relationships to purchase a product, to wit: to compel the purchase of health care
insurance. However, while this particular exercise of power is unprecedented, the
archives of history do provide guidance and counsel.

For example, in his

observation of the problem of government, James Madison noted that:
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.”
The Federalist No. 51, at 348 (N.Y. Heritage Press ed., 1945)(“ Federalist”).
The great difficultly mentioned by Madison is no less present today, as
Congress’ passage of the Act was done so notwithstanding the constitutional limits
circumscribing congressional power by way of the Enumerated Powers of Article I,
section 8. The sole justification offered for such a departure from the principle of
limited government was the assurance of good intentions in offering affordable
health care to the people.
In its answering brief (Doc. No. 27), the government submits an unusually
high amount of information that bears no influence on the constitutional analysis of
the Individual Mandate provision. The government argues that the Individual
Mandate is a rational means to solve the issue of cost-shifting in the health
insurance market. However, as the Declarations of Appellants Baldwin and Pacific
4
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Justice’s president, Brad Dacus, demonstrate, the injury suffered by Appellants for
purposes of establishing a justiciable case under Article III is manifest:
First, sections 1002, 1331, 1441, 3015, and 3504 of the Act require
collection of a broad range of appellant Baldwin’s personal and private marital,
tax, financial, health, and/or medical related information, which are then
aggregated, integrated, and disseminated by and between the federal government,
state and local governments, and private entities. (ER: 62, ll. 18-25.) 1
Second, appellant Pacific Justice is an employer, thus requiring it to
ascertain what steps are required in order to comply with the Act. Such
investigatory steps clearly constitute injury for purposes of Article III analysis.
(ER: 57, 6-8.)
Third, appellant Pacific Justice has suffered injury because the Act “imposes
increased costs on it by compelling employer health plans and employer health
insurance providers to insure employees’ dependent unmarried children for an
extended period of time (until age 26).” (ER: 58, ll. 7-11.)
Fourth, appellant Pacific Justice has suffered injury because the Act
“imposes increased costs on it by preventing it from denying health care insurance
coverage to part-time employees.” (ER: 58, ll. 11-14.)

1

“ER” refers to Appellants’ Excerpts of Record on Appeal, filed in support
of this brief.
5
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Fifth, Appellants have suffered injury in the form of preparation, as well as
suffering imminent harm from the restricted freedom resulting from the Individual
Mandate. That is to say, Appellants are attempting to ascertain their legal situation
relative to an Act they contend is unconstitutional. To wait until the Individual
Mandate becomes effective in 2014 would be to court disaster by placing
themselves in legal jeopardy. (ER: 57, ll. 6-16; 58, 6-14; 62, l. 7 to 63, l. 9.)
Sixth, through the Individual Mandate, it is the government who seeks to
regulate inactivity through the Commerce Clause, rather than Appellants engaging
in activity that may be regulated by Congress. The government is the initiating
force that has resulted in Appellants’ actions, which constitute injury under Article
III. (ER: 57, ll. 6-16; 58, 6-14; 62, l. 7 to 63, l. 9.)
Seventh, citizens such as appellant Baldwin who choose to forego the
purchase of health care insurance have not engaged in activity that can be regulated
by Congress. However, the Act imposes monetary penalties that will be enforced
by the Internal Revenue Service, which constitute harm for purposes of Article III.
(ER: 62, l. 7 to 63, l. 9.)
Finally, it is important to note that where one of multiple plaintiffs satisfies
the standing requirements of Article III, no further inquiry is necessary as the case
is justiciable under Article III. Consequently, if this Court were to conclude that
either appellant has standing, then Article III is satisfied. See, e.g., See Watt v.
6
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Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) (“Because we find
California has standing, we do not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs.”);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264 n. 9 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to maintain this
suit.”); see, also, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228,
1232 (D.C.Cir.1996) (if standing is shown for at least one plaintiff with respect to
each claim, “we need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise that
claim”).
As set forth Section I, supra, the decision in Florida clearly provides all that
is necessary in order for Appellants’ claims to be justiciable under Article III.
However, independent of Florida and as the foregoing summary indicates,
Appellants have satisfied the requirements to make their claims justiciable under
Article III.
B.

APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING UNDER ARTICLE III
This case is justiciable under Article III as the injury is clear from the

allegations and objections made by the Appellants. (ER: 57, l. 7 to 58, l. 14; 62, l. 8
to 63, l. 8.) The failing of the government to understand this fact lies in its inability
to understand or show an appreciation for the breadth of impact the Individual
Mandate has on individuals and organizations.
7
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Appellants Have Suffered Injury in Their Need to Make
Preparations in Response to the Act

In the government’s view, the Individual Mandate is nothing more than a
provision that compels uninsured citizens to obtain insurance or be fined. However,
the reality of the Individual Mandate’s impact on Appellants, which extends
beyond the government’s superficial view, was more succinctly described by U.S.
District Judge Henry Hudson:
“This provision will compel scores of people who are not currently
enrolled to evaluate and contract for insurance coverage. Individuals
currently insured will be required to be sure that their present
plans comply with this regulatory regimen…. Employers will need
to determine if their current insurance satisfies the statutory
requirements.”
Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F.Supp.2d 598, 608 (E.D.Va.2010)(“Virginia”)(emphasis
added).
This factual finding in Virginia speaks directly to the injury suffered by
anyone who, like the Appellants, has gone so far as to raise an objection to the Act
itself. Unlike preventive regulations, the Individual Mandate requires affirmative
conduct on the part of the citizen. Failure to take such government commanded
action leads to the imposition of a penalty. Accordingly, the Act forces individuals
to assess their own status and compliance with the law.

Foresighted acts in

preparation to ensure compliance with the Act is the gravamen of the injury and is
an inherent necessity under the Act. Once this is understood, as it was by the court
8
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in Virginia, how one prepares is irrelevant. Whether an individual hires and pays
an attorney or other expert to interpret the Act and assess his insurance status, or
makes the assessment on his own, is irrelevant. All that is necessary is the
understanding that an act that requires affirmative conduct by some necessarily
requires preparative conduct by all to determine their obligations.

This

preparation, as noted in Virginia, constitutes injury for purposes of establishing
standing under Article III.
The government suggests that the absence of insurance is the sole scenario
in which one might be forced to alter conduct under the Act. This is actually
untrue. Many who in fact have heath care insurance undoubtedly will still not meet
or maintain the government required level of insurance. The reality is that some
who have insurance still do not meet the minimum requirement, and some who do
not have insurance will not purchase it.
The issue here is not the absence of injury; as discussed above, the court in
Virginia recognized the injury through the use of its practical reasoning skills. The
issue is simply that the government wants to heighten the level of specificity
needed to survive a motion to dismiss. The government declares that “[e]ven the
most relaxed pleading standards do not permit a constitutional challenge to proceed
in these circumstances.” (Opp. Br. 23). The government cites no authority that
supports this conclusory statement.
9
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Contrary to the government’s idea of pleading requirements, the Supreme
Court has been clear that in cases concerning pre-enforcement challenges,
deference is to be given to the plaintiff:
“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting
from defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we
‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support the claim.’”
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)(quoting, Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
The government presents a further oversimplification of the issue by
focusing on the supposed absence of Baldwin’s indication of his insurance status.
The government, as well as the district court below, made the mistake of taking a
restrictive and superficial approach to interpreting Appellant Baldwin’s declaration.
Specifically, in his declaration, appellant Baldwin stated that he did not want to be
compelled by the government to maintain health care insurance: “I do not consent
to being compelled to maintain health care insurance…I object to the Act’s
provisions compelling me to maintain health care insurance…” (ER: 62: 4-13.)
There are two aspects of this evidence that support a finding of injury for
standing purposes. First, it clearly states that appellant Baldwin does not want to be
compelled to maintain health insurance, which means the necessary implication is
that he does not presently have, nor will he in the future maintain, the government
mandated health insurance. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that appellant
10
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Baldwin presently has health care insurance, he must still assess whether that
insurance coverage will comply with the minimum amount commanded by the
Individual Mandate. In Florida, Judge Vinson explained why this constituted
injury that satisfies Article III:
“[T]he government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake an expenditure,
for which the government must anticipate that significant financial
planning will be required. That financial planning must take place
well in advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014...There is
nothing improbable about the contention that the Individual Mandate
is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today.”
Florida, supra, at *8 (quoting, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d
882, 889 (E.D.Mich.2010)(“Thomas More”). Judge Vinson notes that in the
pending appeal in Thomas More, the government “expressly declined to challenge
the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing.” Id. at fn. 9.
Whether it is the complaint (ER: 8-54) or the declarations of appellants
Baldwin and Pacific Justice (ER: 55-64), Appellants have provided enough
allegations (in the complaint) and evidence (in the declarations) to satisfy the
standing requirements of Article III. When these allegations and evidence are
coupled with the decision in Florida, this Court should have no difficulty in
finding that Appellants have suffered the required injury under Article III.
/////
/////

11

Case: 10-56374 02/07/2011 Page: 18 of 34

2.

ID: 7639118 DktEntry: 30

Pacific Justice Satisfies Article III Standing Through its Status as
an Employer and Through the Representation of Its Members

Appellant Pacific Justice has two separate grounds to satisfy the standing
requirement of Article III. First, Pacific Justice is an employer that provides health
insurance to its employees, thereby subjecting it to the provisions of the Act. (ER:
57, ll. 6-8.) Furthermore, Pacific Justice claims injury from the Act because it
“imposes increased costs on it by compelling employer health plans and employer
health insurance providers to insure employees’ dependent unmarried children for
extended periods of time (until age 26).” (ER: 58, ll. 7-11.) Similarly, the Act
damages Pacific Justice because it “imposes increased costs on it by preventing it
from denying health care insurance coverage to part-time employees.” (ER: 58, ll.
11-14.)
Second, Pacific Justice may assert a claim on behalf of its members, as it has
established association standing because: "(1) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane
to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claims asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of the individual members in the lawsuit."
McKinney v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1550 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

12
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APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS ARE RIPE UNDER ARTICLE III
On the issue of ripeness, the litigation of this case throughout the country

has helped reaffirm that the factual record needs no development for the
adjudication of the issue before the court.

In order to satisfy ripeness, the

interested party must show that the case would not be clarified by further factual
development.
The question before the Court in this case is a question purely of the
constitutionality of a provision enacted and fixed in time by virtue of its adoption
by Congress in early 2010. Delay in resolving the constitutional questions would
not place this Court in any better position than if they were immediately addressed.
When addressing the issue of a pre-enforcement challenge, the Supreme
Court has held that a claim is ripe if there is certitude that enforcement will occur.
“[W]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute against
[plaintiffs] is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed
provisions come into effect.”
Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974). Furthermore,
in addressing a motion to dismiss, Judge Vinson concluded that the Act is ripe for
adjudication and pointed to the agreement of the district courts in Virginia and
Thomas More on the same issue.
“The fact that the individual mandate and employer mandate do not
go into effect until 2014 does not mean that they will not be felt in the
immediate or very near future. To be sure, responsible individuals,
13
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businesses, and states will have to start making plans now or very
shortly to comply with the Act's various mandates. Individuals who
are presently insured will have to confirm that their current plans
comply with the Act's requirements and, if not, take appropriate steps
to comply; the uninsured will need to research available insurance
plans, find one that meets their needs, and begin budgeting
accordingly; and employers and states will need to revamp their
healthcare programs to ensure full compliance. I note that at least two
courts considering challenges to the individual mandate have thus far
denied motions to dismiss on standing and ripeness grounds.”
State of Florida, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of HHS, 716 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1149-1150
(N.D.Fla.2010)(“Florida I”).
The emphasis on the issue of ripeness in cases such as these is on the
probability of enforcement rather than the certainty of what will occur in the life of
the plaintiff between now and the time of enforcement. As there is no debate over
whether the government intends to enforce the Individual Mandate, this case is ripe
for adjudication and needs no further factual development. Id.

III.

BY REGULATING INACTIVITY, CONGRESS EXCEEDED ITS
COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
The only difficulty that arises in assessing the constitutionality of the

Individual Mandate is in parceling out the relevant arguments made by the
government from the massive amounts of irrelevant information proffered.
Despite its best efforts, once all the smoke and mirrors have cleared, the
government can do nothing to change the simple language that defines Congress’
14
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power under the Commerce Clause as circumscribed by Supreme Court decision,
which, for example, requires the regulation of activity:
“[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is
empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. “
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995)(“Lopez”)(citations
omitted)(emphasis added).
Despite Lopez’s clear and unequivocal language, the government insists, as
it did in Florida and Virginia, that activity is not actually necessary in order for
Congress to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause. Consequently, any
analysis must necessarily commence with the affirmation that activity is, indeed,
required to support a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. Id.

A.

ACTIVITY REMAINS A SINE QUA NON FOR A PROPER EXERCISE
CONGRESS’ POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

OF

The government cites Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005) (“Raich”), a
case in which the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of the growing of
marijuana in one’s own home, as evidence that activity is not necessary for
15
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Congress to exercise its power under the Commerce Clause:
“[T]he Supreme Court found it irrelevant that the plaintiffs were not
engaged in commercial activity and that they did not buy, sell, or
distribute any portion of the marijuana that they possessed. The
regulation was proper, the Court held, because ‘Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana
outside federal control would . . . affect price and market conditions.’
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. The failure to regulate such consumption
would, in the aggregate, have a ‘substantial effect on supply and
demand in the national market for that commodity.’”
(Opp. Br. 46.) This is quite the slight of hand, as the government attempts to
rewrite and expand Raich to include inactivity. Of course the government’s
interpretation of Raich (as well as Lopez) is improper. Specifically, in both Raich
and Lopez there was activity (i.e., some kind of action occurring). For example, in
Raich there was the growing and consuming of marijuana. In contradistinction, in
the case of the Individual Mandate there is inactivity, to wit: a person such as
appellant Baldwin not purchasing health care insurance.
In an attempt to give further credibility to its attempted expansion of Raich
and Lopez, the government harkens back the Supreme Court decision in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(“Wickard”), a case involving a family that had
grown wheat for personal consumption on its private farm. In Wickard, the Court
determined that the growing of wheat itself could be regulated despite the fact that
the wheat did not enter commerce.
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In Florida, Judge Vinson dismissed the government’s invitation to expand
Raich and Lopez to include inactivity:
“In every Supreme Court case decided thus far, Congress was not
seeking to regulate under its commerce power something that could
even arguably be said to be ‘passive inactivity.’”
Florida, supra, 2011 WL 285683 at *21. Judge Vinson goes on to explain why the
government’s attempt to expand Raich and Lopez to include inactivity would
eviscerate the Constitution’s bedrock principles of limited government and
enumerated powers:
“If Congress can penalize a passive individual for failing to engage in
commerce, the enumeration of powers in the Constitution would have
been in vain for it would be ‘difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power’ and we would have a Constitution in name only.
Surely this is not what the Founding Fathers could have intended.”
Id. at *22 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added).
The government’s suggestion that a person, such as appellant Baldwin, who
chooses not to purchase health care insurance, somehow constitutes activity is
contrary not only to Raich, Lopez, and Wickard but also Congress’ own admission
in the Act. Judge Vinson focused on the language used by Congress in the Act to
refute the government’s position:
“I must agree with the plaintiffs’ contention that the individual
mandate regulates inactivity. Section 1501 states in relevant part: ‘If
an applicable individual fails to [buy health insurance], there is
hereby imposed a penalty.’ By its very own terms, therefore, the
statute applies to a person who does not buy the government-approved
17
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insurance; that is, a person who ‘fails’ to act pursuant to the
congressional dictate.”
Id. at *23 (emphasis added).
In conclusion, the inactivity of not purchasing health care insurance does not
trigger Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Raich, Lopez, Wickard, and
Florida.

B.

AS CONGRESS’ ENACTMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS NOT A
PROPER EXERCISE OF ITS COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER, THE
GOVERNMENT’S ANALYSIS UNDER THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
IS IRRELEVANT
There is a great deal of effort made on the part of the government to show

the rational nature of the individual mandate with respect to its economic goals.
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue with the notion that forcing people to
purchase a product is a rational way to fund a system. However, the rational
means used are irrelevant if the regulation itself is not grounded in a legitimate
exercise of power by Congress. In this case, because the Individual Mandate was
not a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the
Necessary and Proper Clause has no application.
Furthermore, the government treats the Necessary and Proper Clause as
though it were an enumerated and independent source of congressional power. In
Federalist 33, Alexander Hamilton explained this is not a proper interpretation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Furthermore, he also goes on to characterize the
18
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dangers inherent in such a misinterpretation, which in his view would be “merely
[an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’" Federalist,
supra, No. 33, at 204-05.
As it relates to the Individual Mandate, Judge Vinson explains the error of
the government’s attempt to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause as an
independent source of congressional authority:
“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held, and the emphasized text
makes clear, that the [Necessary and Proper] Clause is not an
independent source of federal power; rather, it is simply a caveat
that the Congress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the
specifically granted foregoing powers of [section] 8 and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution. [It] is but merely a declaration,
for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into
execution those (powers) otherwise granted are included in the grant.”
Florida, supra, 2011 WL 285683 at *30 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960))(internal quotations omitted). Similarly, in
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Supreme Court made clear that the
Necessary and Proper Clause “is not the delegation of a new and independent
power, but simply provision for making effective” Congress’ enumerated powers.
Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see, also, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923924 (1997)(where the Supreme Court would not use the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a source of power to justify violation of state sovereignty).
As the foregoing demonstrates, the law with respect to the Necessary and
Proper Clause is clear: it must have its roots in an enumerated power. Accordingly,
19
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the Court should ignore the government’s argument that the Individual Mandate
provision is authorized under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

IV.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE WAS NOT ENACTED PURSUANT TO
CONGRESS’ TAXING POWER
Congressional power surrounding taxation is much more expansive than the

ability to regulate interstate commerce. Due to this fact, the government has
constructed a defense of the Individual Mandate provision under the guise that it
was passed pursuant to its taxing powers. It argues that Congress did not need to
explicitly state that it was taking action under its taxing powers in order to be
justified under the taxing powers, citing Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138 (1948): “The question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress
does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.” Id. at
144.
The issue is not that Congress did not recite its power and declare the
provision a tax, but rather, that Congress specifically intended the provision not to
be a tax. In this regard, “If it clearly appear[s] that it is the will of Congress that
the provision shall not be regarded as in the nature of a penalty, the court must be
governed by that will.” Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 613
(1903)(“Helwig”)(emphasis added). In Florida I, Judge Vinson applied Helwig to
demonstrate that the Individual Mandate was not a tax but rather a penalty:
20
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“As applied to the facts of this case, Helwig can be interpreted as
concluding that, regardless of whether the exaction could otherwise
qualify as a tax (based on the dictionary definition or ‘ordinary or
general meaning of the word’), it cannot be regarded as one if it
‘clearly appears’ that Congress did not intend it to be. In this case,
there are several reasons (perhaps none dispositive alone, but
convincing in total) why it is inarguably clear that Congress did not
intend for the exaction to be regarded as a tax.”
Florida I, supra, 716 F.Supp.2d at 1133.
As a comprehensive discussion of why the Individual Mandate is a penalty
rather than a tax was provided in detail by Judge Vinson in Florida I, Id. at 11301144, the remainder of this section will be presented in summary form. 2
The government attempts to argue that the Individual Mandate can still be
regarded as a tax despite Congress’ failure to specify use of its taxation powers in
the Act. However, its silence is what indicates intent in this case because Congress
had the wherewithal to label it a tax as it had in previous versions of the bill. The
fact that it was not labeled as a tax in this version carries with it only one logical
implication: that Congress did not intend it to be a tax. Furthermore, it is not as
though the Act jettisoned all use of language which referred to taxation, as there
are taxes enumerated throughout the bill. See, e.g., Excise Tax on Medical Device

2

In Virginia, Judge Hudson also held that the Individual Mandate was a
penalty rather than a tax. Virginia, supra, 702 F.Supp.2d at 612-615.
.
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Manufacturers, § 1405 (“There is hereby imposed on the sale of any taxable
medical device by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax”); Excise Tax on
High Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage, § 9001 (“there is hereby
imposed a tax”); Additional Hospital Insurance Tax on High-Income Taxpayers, §
9015 (“there is hereby imposed a tax”); Excise Tax on Indoor Tanning Services, §
10907 (“There is hereby imposed on any indoor tanning service a tax”).
After listing the foregoing sections of the Act in which Congress identified
that it was creating a tax, Judge Vinson concludes:
“This shows beyond question that Congress knew how to impose a tax
when it meant to do so. Therefore, the strong inference and
presumption must be that Congress did not intend for the ‘penalty’ to
be a tax.”
Florida I, supra, 716 F.Supp.2d at 1135 (emphasis added).
Finally, in Florida I, the court calls attention to the government’s own words
during oral argument in Virginia, wherein the court cites the government’s
reference to the taxing power:
“Although that power is broad and does not easily lend itself to judicial
review, counsel stated, ‘there is a check. It's called Congress. And taxes are
scrutinized. And the reason we don't have all sorts of crazy taxes is because
taxes are among the most scrutinized things we have. And the elected
representatives in Congress are held accountable for taxes that they
impose.’”
Florida I, supra, 716 F.Supp.2d at 1142 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument in
Virginia case) (emphasis added).
22
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The obvious conflict that now exists is that the government would have the
court disregard what Congress actually imposed. The accountability of Congress
will fail if they are allowed to pass a bill under the assertion that it means one thing
and enforce it under the assertion that it means something else. In the words of the
Florida court:
“Congress should not be permitted to secure and cast politically
difficult votes on controversial legislation by deliberately calling
something one thing, after which the defenders of that legislation take
an ‘Alice-in-Wonderland’ tack and argue in court that Congress really
meant something else entirely, thereby circumventing the safeguard
that exists to keep their broad power in check.”
Id. at 1143.
As the foregoing demonstrates, Congress is prohibited from calling the
Individual Mandate a penalty in the Act and then calling it a tax in court.
Accordingly, the Individual Mandate was enacted pursuant to Congress’
Commerce Power not its Taxing Powers.

V.

THE ACT MUST BE STRUCK DOWN IN ITS ENTIRETY BECAUSE
THE ACT DOES NOT CONTAIN A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE
If the Individual Mandate provision is deemed unconstitutional by this

Court, the Act will no longer be able to function properly as it is a vital component
to the legislative scheme. Moreover, in Florida the government conceded that the
Individual Mandate is the cornerstone of the Act:
23
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“Moreover, the defendants have conceded that the Act's health
insurance reforms cannot survive without the individual mandate,
which is extremely significant because the various insurance
provisions, in turn, are the very heart of the Act itself. The health
insurance reform provisions were cited repeatedly during the health
care debate, and they were instrumental in passing the Act. In speech
after speech President Obama emphasized that the legislative goal was
‘health insurance reform’ and stressed how important it was that
Congress fundamentally reform how health insurance companies do
business, and ‘protect every American from the worst practices of the
insurance industry.’ See, for example, Remarks of President Obama,
The State of the Union, delivered Jan. 27, 2009. Meanwhile, the Act's
supporters in the Senate and House similarly spoke repeatedly and
often of the legislative efforts as being the means to comprehensively
reform the health insurance industry.”
Florida, supra, 2011 WL 285683 at *36.
The Supreme Court has provided guidance in determining the legal effect of
the absence of a severability clause. This determination begins with a look at
legislative intent: “The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an
inquiry into legislative intent.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999). From there, a reviewing court looks to the functionality
of the act after removal of the invalidated section:
“Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision
to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.”
Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 at 684 (1987). Therefore, in order to
determine whether a provision is severable, it must be determined “whether [after
removing the invalid provision] the [remaining] statute will function in a manner
24
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consistent with the intent of Congress.” Id. at 685.
Two indicators point to the intent of Congress for the Act not to be severable
if the Individual Mandate provision were held unenforceable. First, it specifically
removed a severability clause where it had once existed in a former version of the
Bill. “Where Congress includes [particular] language in an earlier version of a bill
but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the [omitted provision]
was not intended.”

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24(1983).

Consequently, Congress’ overt act of removing the severability clause from the Act
evinces a clear intent to not have the legislation survive if the Individual Mandate
provision were held to be unconstitutional.
Second, the Act cannot properly function independent of the Individual
Mandate. For example, Congress argued that provisions which prohibit the denial
of coverage based on preexisting conditions is balanced out by the Individual
Mandate, which will “broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.” Section 1501(a)(2)(I)
of the Act (as amended by section 10106(a)). Accordingly, this evidence
demonstrates Congress’ intent that the Individual Mandate is intended and
designed to work in concert with the rest of the Act.
If this Court were to declare the Individual Mandate unconstitutional,
coupled with the facts that the Act does not have a severability clause and that
25
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Congress intended the Individual Mandate to be the cornerstone of the Act, this
Court should declare the entire Act unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Baldwin and Pacific Justice respectfully request the Court to issue an order:
1.

Reversing the district court’s decision;

2.

Declaring the Individual Mandate unconstitutional;

3.

Declaring the entire Act unconstitutional because the individual

mandate is not severable from the Act;
4.

Enjoining enforcement of the Act in its entirety; and

5.

Awarding Baldwin and Pacific Justice their costs and attorneys’ fees

on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39 and § 1988(b).
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